Review of Binding Updates Security in MIPv6

Review of Binding Updates tribute in MIPv6Avishek Dutta Vikram Raju R.Abstract Mobile Nodes (MN) in Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) argon given the opportunity to eliminate triangle routing that is inefficient with their own corresponding node (CN) using Route Optimization (RO). This greatly improves the mathematical operation of the ne devilrk. Unfortunately, using this method allows several security vulnerabilities to manifest itself with the MIPv6. Among those, common issues argon those concerns the verification of authenticity and authorization of Binding Updates during the process of RO. These flakes of unauthenticated and unauthorized BUs be the key to various types of malicious attacks. Since it is expected that MIPv6 exit be supported by IPv6, several mechanism to ensure BU security will be authoritative in the next generation Internet. This article foc occasions on Mobile IPv6 and security considerations.Keywords/Index TermIKE, Mobile IPv6, Network Security, Potential threats in M IPv6I. IntroductionThe office MIPv6 operates stand be seen in Figure 1 1, with 3 node types, namely the Home Agent (HA), Mobile Node (MN) and the Corresponding Node (CN) 2, plot of land MNs mobility is detected by a router advertisement message including an MN able to make a router send its advertisement message by request, if necessityed. Following mobility detection, the MN gets a CoA unlike in MIPv4, after which it sends the BU message to the HA and the extendd corresponding node (a node wishing to connect to, or is communicating with MN). The HA and corresponding node update the binding list and send acknowledgement messages 1, meaning that the Mobile IPv6 allows an MN to alter its attachment point to the net income while maintaining established communications 3. This paper presents an analysis of both Route Optimisation (RO) and Identity Based Encryption (IBE) communications protocol with proposal to strengthen the take of security of a BU method. This method employme nts the public key to create an certification that is stronger.II. MN-HA earmarkMutual authentication between an MN and its HA is mandatory in MIPv6, and usually performed with IPSec and IKE, while session key generation and authentication are done with IKE. Using X.509 certificates in IKE is the existing method of performing these tasks.The MN moves to a foreign network and obtains a radical CoA.MN carries out a BU on its HA (where the new CoA is registered). HA sends a binding acknowledgement to MN.A Correspondent Node (CN) tries to contact MN, with HA intercepting packets destined to MN.Next, HA tunnels all packets from CN to MN using MNs CoA.When MN replies to the CN, it may use its current CoA (and bind to the CN) and communicate with the CN directly (route optimization), or it could tunnel all its packets through the HA.Sometimes MN and HA share a common whodunit, possibly occurring in WLAN instances when MN shifts to an separate WLAN which requires authentication 4. If th ere are no shared secrets, extending the IKEv2 authentication process to identity-based authentication as opposed to X.509-based authentication certificates is usual. It can also be assumed that both MN and HA use the same PKG, and according to the relationship between these three entities, any institutionalise level from I to III may be applied during private key delivery. Regarding IKE, two main methods of implementing IBE exist, the first of which involves modifying IKEs four-way handshake while the twinkling utilizes EAP to generate a new IBE-based EAP authentication method 4.A. Modifying IKEIKE could implement IBE through the addition of a third authentication method, other than the previous shared secret and X.509 authentication. Instead of X.509 certificates, IKE also uses IBE certificates. IBE-based authentication functions fundamentally the same as X.509 authentication, in that to authenticate mates the same information block should be signed as in the X.509-based authen tication, in addition to a signature based on IBE (i.e. the Hess signature). Currently, identities are replacing certificates and revocation lists do not need to be checked. Ehmke (2007) implemented a prototype which can realize this idea. Performance wise, clearly transmit certificates or certificate requests are no longer incumbent since the IKE identity can be used straight as the public key for authentication. Also, expensive certificate-chain checking is redundant while elliptic curve cryptography-based hardware- accelerated IBE algorithms are sometimes quite efficient, in particular in embedded devices 4.B. Extensible credential ProtocolSeveral wireless networks utilize the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) 5 for access authentication. EAP techniques commonly deal with abdominal aortic aneurysm servers which affect the required authentications, after which notifications are relayed back to a functional module (Network Access Server) in the access network. For Mobile IPv6 6, the Binding Authentication data option 7 helps enable different authentication techniques, while a subtype exists for AAA- based authentication like EAP. On the other hand, there fluent are EAP methods requiring trim handling and specifications which present Binding Authentication Data option documentation does not provide. Currently, specification from this document is for at least some very wide deployed EAP methods, so, often, when EAP is needed, Mobile IPv6 tunnel redirection to a wireless devices new CoA can be done much faster 8-10.C. Using Extensible Authentication ProtocolFigure 2 illustrates possible steps in EAP implementation. It is advisable to use EAP as part when establishing a concurrent shared key to be used in the final two message supersedes leading to authentication 4. Chen and Kudlas key agreement with IBE technique is one alternative protocol (protocol 2 in 11) that can function in the absence of a key escrow, so CERTREQ and CERT messages in steps 2, 3, 4 are not necessary (Figure. 2). Figure 3 illustrates the resulting IKE Initial Message exchange.1. I _ R HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni2. R _ I HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, CERTREQ3. I _ R HDR, ESKIDi,CERTREQ,IDr,SAi2,TSi,TSr4. R _ I HDR, ESKIDr,CERT,AUTH,EAP5. I _ R HDR, ESKEAP6. R _ I HDR, ESKEAP.. n. R _ I HDR, ESKEAP(success)n+1. I _ R HDR, ESKAUTHn+2. R _ I HDR, ESKAUTH,SAr2,TSi,TSrFig 2. IKE Initial Message Exchange Authentication using EAP 12.Here, the same PKG is shared by MN and HA, where P is a public PKG parameter, and HA and MN choose the random numbers a and b, respectively. The Chen-Kudla protocol produces a session key solely for message 7 and 8authentication. The AUTH payloads have to authenticatemessages 3 and 4 based on MAC and a secret key generatedby an EAP protocol 11.1. MN _ HA HDR, SAMN1, KEMN, NMN2. HA _ MN HDR, SAHA1, KEHA, NHA3. MN _ HA HDR, ESKIDMN,IDHA,SAMN2,TSMN,TSHA4. HA _ MN HDR,ESKIDHA,AUTH,EAP_CK_Req(aP,aQHA)5. MN _ HA HDR, ESKEAP_CK_Res(bP,bQMN)6. HA _ MN HDR, ESK EAP(success)7. MN _ HA HDR, ESKAUTH8. HA _ MN HDR, ESKAUTH,SAHA2,TSMN,TSHAFig 3. IKE Initial Message Exchange EAP with IBE Authentication 12.But since IBE uses PKG, it is almost impossible to guesswhich MN will be communicated by the CN. We cannotsimply assume the same PKG is used by both MN andCN. Multi-PKG is used instead but it is not recommended for large networks.III. MN-CN AuthenticationVia the MIPv6 protocol, MN can keep its networkconnection even when the network attachment modifies13. An MN can be reached at its basis call up (HA)anytime, even when not physically in its home network.When an MN is connected to a foreign network it obtains aCoA from the local router through stateless or statefulautoconfiguration. Next, for home r egistra tion, the MNsends HA its current location information (CoA) in a BUmessage, then HA can redirect and tunnel packets intended.for the MNs home address, to the MNs CoA. When aforeign network MN is in contact with a CN (a stationaryor mobile p eer communicating with a MN) through theHA, bidirectional tunnelling takes place for instances whenCN is not bound to the MN (registration is in progress) orMIPv6 is not supported by CN 4.If the CN supports MIPv6, a more than effective mobilerouting technique, Route Optimization (RO), can be used.RO is effective as it provides the most direct, shortest pathof transmitting messages between an MN and a CN,eliminating the need for packets to pass through the HA, andavoiding triangular routing (bidirectional tunnelling). Priorto setting up RO, the MN must send CN a BU packetcontaining its CoA with present location data. On theother hand, security risks with RO 14 can be for examplethat an MN may send CN a false BU packet and redirectthe communication stream to a want location, resulting ina Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Thus, for increasedsecurity, it is important to authenticate BUs in RO 4 15.What happens between a CN and MN is not the same asbetween an MN and its HA. Since CN cou ld be any node,MN and CN have no shared secrets or trusted certificates.Thus, Return Routability (RR) can be used, as An MN sends CN a home test init (HoTi) andcare-of test init (CoTi). HoTi is sent directlythrough the HA and CoTi. HoTi has the homeaddress and CoTi has the CoA as source addresses,both including a cookie. Upon receiving either HoTi or CoTi message,CN forthwith answers with a home test (HoT)and care- of test (CoT) message which gets sent tothe respective source address. Each reply containsthe cookie recovered from the nonce indenx,corresponding init message, and a keygen token,later for BU authentication use.When MN receives HoT and CoT, RR is done. OnlyMN can receive packets sent to both its HA and CoA, andcan now hash the two tokens to calculate the binding key.This key is utilized for generating a Message AuthenticationCode (MAC) for BUs, and MAC can be verified by CN.RR provides an analysis of a nodes reach-ability duringauthentication but do not validate address ownership in IPv6.IV. MIPv6 Security AnalysisProviding security against different types of maliciousattacks e.g. denial of armed service (DoS), connection hijacking,man- in-the-middle and impersonation, are the basicobjectives for the development of IPv6. The objective ofimproved security is to create routing changes that are safeagainst all threats. Threats are based on the routing changesthat provides mobility in the network. Threats faced byMobile IPv6 security can be divided into different categories__ Binding update (BU) to HA type threats__ Route Optimisation to CN type threats__ Threats that attack the tunnelling process betweenHA and MN__ Threats that uses Mobile IPv6 routing header toreturn traffic of other nodesBinding update and route optimisation threats are relatedto authentication of binding messages. Communicationbetween MN and HA unavoidably trust and communicationauthentication. This is because MN agrees to implement theHA services therefrom relationship between the two mustfirst be secure. However, the CN and MN does not haveprior relationship but authenticating messages between thetwo is still possible. For example, this is possible byauthenticating the public key. If a malicious packet is sent tothe HA using the same source address as the MN, the HAwill then forward the packet containing the MNs sourceaddress contained in the malicious node. However, this DoSattack can be prevented by using an algorithm to hold theBU message receives by the HA. Such threat can also beavoided when a new routing header is used to replaces theincorrect header that manoeuvres around firewall rules andobtaining a constrained address 16, 17.V. Proposed Protection of BU MessageCorresponding Author XYZ, emailprotectedOnce the BU message is complete, the MN will receivenormal traffic from the CN with the new CoA. The CNwith the new nonce sends to the MN a Binding UpdateVerification (BUV) within a specific time frame e.g. 10seconds. The MN then needs to reply wi thin 10 secondsotherwise the connection between MN and CN will beterminated. This method minimises any damages caused bybombing attacks where packets are sent to the MN bymalicious nodes. Cryptography Generated Address (CGA)can also be use to make spoofing type attacks more harder.Private keys can be use to signed the message as well. Sinceredirection attacks requires both public and private keys toperform18-20. Possible threats and solution is listed intable 1 4, 17.VI. ConclusionThe sine qua non for Mobile IPv6 is still not completeconsidering there are some essential issues that are notaddressed. One of the most important issues are protocolsecurity because without secure protection againstattacks, the protocol would not be accepted thus will notwork at all. Presently, the standard method use for BUprotection in transport mode as well as securing theconnection for control message sent during home registrationmethod is the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP). IPSechas several a dvantages over SSL/TLS which is IPSeccan perform without IP restriction, any protocol can beencrypted and also encrypt any packets with just their IPheaders. Unfortunately, IPSec needs to be configured withvarious settings thus making it complicated. 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During 1997-1999, he stayed in Communications Research testing ground (CRL), Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Japan to study digital beam forming antennas, mobile satellite communication systems, and wireless access network using stratospheric platforms. He now with DDI Tokyo scoop Telephone, Inc.